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Abstract:  
It is already known the fact that the performance of an enterprise is the result of good or bad 
management. But when we talk about "management" often we overlook, or even worse, we 
don’t consider such problems associated with the growth strategies of companies, which 
normally derive from the forms of governance. Surveys made so far lead us to conclude that 
the actual performance of a large number of enterprises, engaged in various agribusiness 
industries is highly associated with both the issues mentioned above, and therefore they are 
the focus of this study. Our goal is that by the conclusions drawn in this paper, can be offered 
recommendations on growth strategies that enterprises should implement, and more rational 
governance forms according to industries. 
 
Keywords: Growth strategy; governance structure; horizontal integration; concentric 
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Introduction: 
According to Coase, the activity of the enterprise is more superior to the market itself, 
since it directly affected by the price mechanism. This situation makes that enterprises face 
additional costs, transaction costs, which include research costs, information costs for raw 
materials, monitoring costs, negotiation costs, costs of signing and implementing contracts 
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etc. These costs can be reduced through internal organization, or by establishing an authority 
to direct productive resources in the enterprise. 
To recognize and evaluate the transactions costs should be recognized naturally 
different types of governance structures, and critical dimensions that serve to characterize a 
transaction. A governance structure is a set of institutional arrangements within which it is 
organized and conducted a transaction, which means that a particular structure of government 
is in favor of a government or certain transactions. Referring to Governance structures we 
can distinguish market governance, internal governance and hybrid governance. 
 
Agribusiness companies and growth strategies: 
 Managing growth of agribusiness enterprises is one of the most important challenges 
to managers and management teams as a whole. For this, it is important to identify and 
resolve towards strategies that enable the growth of companies, in benefit to fulfill the 
defined objectives. To select and implement a growth strategy, it is important to analyze and 
evaluate in detail the company, in the framework of the totality of internal and external 
factors that condition the production. Referring to the objective of this research, we studied a 
number of agribusiness enterprises, in terms of strategies undertaken on their growth, as it is 
shown in the data of the following table: 
    Processing industries / Number of enterprises   
No. Indicators Wine Tot
. 
Meat Tot
. 
Olive 
Oil 
Tot. Milk Tot
. 
    No % En
t. 
No % En
t. 
No % Ent. No % En
t. 
1 Vertical 
integration 
5 5 103 5 8 63 8 6 127   0 352 
2 Horizontal 
integration 
7 7 103 4 6 63 13 10 127 34 10 352 
3 Sustainable 
Growth 
  0 103   0 63   0 127   0 352 
4 Concentric 
diversification 
44 4
3 
103 6 10 63   0 127 165 47 352 
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5 Conglomerate 
diversification 
  0 103  
5 
8 63   0 127   0 352 
6 Concentration in 
one product  
  0 103   0 63   0 127   0 352 
7 Developing new 
products 
2 2 103  
4 
6 63 6 5 127  
2 
1 352 
8 Increase of 
profitability 
  0 103   0 63   0 127   0 352 
9 High productivity   0 103 3 5 63   0 127 2 1 352 
10 Strong 
competitive 
position 
  0 103     
2 
3 63   0 127   0 352 
11 Technological 
leadership 
  0 103   0 63   0 127   0 352 
12 Public 
responsibility 
  0 103   0 63   0 127   0 352 
13 Diversification   0 103   0 63   0 127   0 352 
14 Investment in 
securities market 
  0 103   0 63   0 127   0 352 
15 Investments 
outside agriculture 
  0 103   0 63   0 127 2 1 352 
16 Joint ventures   0 103   0 63   0 127   0 352 
17 Strategic Alliances   0 103   0 63   0 127   0 352 
Table  1. Action strategies undertaken by several companies according to the industries
*
  
 
Considering in general the information presented in the table, it can be easily deduced 
that the companies involved in analyzed industries, do little or no effort to identify and 
                                                          
 
* Industry of wine, meat, olive oil and milk 
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implementation of specific strategies to increase. As can be seen, two basic strategies of 
growth, vertical integration and horizontal had found little or no effect. 
Vertical integration strategy is adopted by a limited number of agro-industry 
enterprises, which operate mainly in the wine industry, meat and olive oil. This type of 
integration occurs primarily as integration with leading before and for the meat industry as 
well as integration with back leading (but very limited levels), to the wine industry and olive 
oil. Enterprises that have chosen this type of strategy are better focused on reducing 
transaction costs. Similarly, they believe (and have the right course), that a strategy of 
vertical integration can be considered as a very good strategy in terms of risk management, or 
investment diversification. 
Enterprises focused on horizontal integration strategy, believe that a strategy of 
horizontal integration will allow them extra benefits because of the presence of economies of 
scale, improved competitive position in the markets as a result of increased quality and 
productivity, reduced transaction costs at the same value chain, etc. As shown the results 
from the data table above, have implemented this strategy about 13% of enterprises of olive 
oil industry and about 10% of the milk industry enterprises. 
 As can be seen in the table, a considerable number of enterprises are focused in 
concentric diversification strategy (if it is considered as a growth strategy). In the wine 
industry, about 43% of enterprises result with the tendency to increase the size of business, 
10% of enterprises in the meat industry and about 47% of the enterprises of the dairy 
industry. 
However, as noted above, it is difficult to talk about a particular kind of enterprise 
growth strategies, much less to implement certain governance structure, to the benefit of 
reducing costs and increasing profitability. 
 
Enterprise as a governance structure 
Should the enterprise be evaluated as governance structure? 
Referring to the theory of the costs transaction, Coase emphasizes that firm’s activity 
(with leader authority its entrepreneur), represents a superior activity than the market itself, 
because the firm is directly affected by the price mechanism. Costs incurred by this 
mechanism are composed by the costs of getting the fairest price, the negociation costs and 
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signing contracts costs. In this context, Coase emphasizes that organizing the firm, as well 
specifying an authority to lead the productive resources in the firm,  these costs may be 
reduced. Referring to this fact, he doesn’t see the firm as e production unit defined 
technologically, but as a governance structure that organize the production using the market, 
use which causes to it cost. 
In a study of 60’, Coase turned to the concept of transaction costs, showing the 
relationship between output that can be obtained from a given qunatity of inputs and 
organization form that governs these inputs. After him, other economists began to link the 
produstion problem with organization problem in an environment where the transaction costs 
confirming the production organization effectiveness is conditioned by human, economic, 
environment factors, etc which can cause market failures. Failures can be eleminated if these 
factors can be better managed through internal organization. 
To recognize and evaluate the transaction costs, naturally should be recognized 
different types of governance structures, (market governance, internal governance and hybrid 
governance) and also the critic dimesions to characterize a transaction. Considering the fact 
that in essence of governance structure are the problems related with transaction costs, it is 
necessary to emphasize the critic dimensions that serve a transaction are uncertainty in which 
transaction take place, frequency with which it occurs and sustainability of the investment 
transaction. 
But, what is a governance structure? A governance structure is a set of institutional 
arragements within which it is organized and conducted a transaction (McFetridge, 1994). 
This menas that, in an enterprise, a certain structure of government is in favor of the 
government of one or some transactions. The foundamental purpose of transactions 
government is to ensure transaction rules in the relations between partners, when they are 
characterized by potential conflicts which threat the possibilities of achieving mutual 
benefits. Analyzing recently, a good transaction government makes possible that partners 
involved in it to realize mutual benefits. 
Transaction costs analyze must begin with the study of the governance structure. In 
order to establish the link between the tendency to minimize  the transaction costs, is 
necessary to identify  the characteristics of governance structures that affect transaction costs. 
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Different authors characterize governance structures according to the rate of voluntary or 
mandatory action. In general they note that: 
 Market governance is characterize by voluntary actions of transaction between 
partners.  
 Internal governance is characterize by mandatory actions, defined by an authority of 
the high management level. 
 Hybrid governance is voluntary before finalizing the contract and mandatory as long 
as the agreement is valued.  
According to Williamson 1991, market governance, internal and hybrid governance 
can be distinguished by: stimulus intensity, administrative control and type of contracts.   
No. Instruments Governance structures 
Market Internal Hybrid 
1 Stimulus intensity ++ 0 + 
2 Administrative control 0 ++ + 
3 Adaption options  +  
4 Autonomy ++ 0 + 
5 Coordination level  0 ++ + 
6 The types of contracts used Classical Relational Neo–classic 
Relational 
Legend:                                               ++:strong                +:semi strong,                        
0 weak 
     Table 2. Characterization
†
 of governances structures    
 
Considering above, we can conclude that : Market governance, (distribution of 
resources through demand- supply mechanism) is characterized by strong stimulus intensity, 
not the use od administrative control, adaptive autonomous mechanisms, the use od classical 
contracts etc.  
                                                          
 
†  Williamson, 1991, pp.281 
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Internal governance, (distribution of resources with command) is characterized by 
weak stimulus intensity, use of administrative control, adaptive opportunities, coordination, 
relational use of contracts, etc.   
Hybrid governance, is characterized by the use of semi powerful stimulants, use of 
adaptive autonomous mechanisms, coordination, use of neo-classical contracts.  
It is important to note that, when each actor's contribution to production is clear, then 
there is no opportunistic behavior and stimulus intensity will provide much better results, 
thus motivating all stakeholders to maximize their efforts. But, despite this fact, the market 
governance (for a given transaction) will not be efficient because the market mechanism will 
stimulate actors to act opportunistically and it will be difficult to be detected by other actors 
involved in the transaction. This phenomenon of market governance structure can be reduced 
through the application of the governance market structure with coordinated actors between 
them. 
Referring to the internal governance structure, the effects of opportunistic behavior 
will be reduced due to administrative controls, as well as a better cooperation and 
coordination. In such a structure, monitoring and administrative control is less costly than in 
a situation with autonomous actors, as happens in the government market. In conclusion we 
can say that incentive or stimulus intensity and administrative control are important 
instruments of governance structure to guide the efforts of stakeholders, in particular, to 
enable that all stakeholders will use all their resources on activities which are engaged . 
Referred to three basic governance structures, market governance, internal governance and 
hybrid governance, interviewed enterprises were surveyed regarding governance structures 
that they adopt. The data obtained are posed below: 
 
    Processing industries 
No. Indicators Wine Meat Olive oil Milk 
  
  
No
. 
En
t. 
With 
gov. 
struc.. 
% 
No
. 
En
t. 
With 
gov. 
struc.% 
No
. 
En
t. 
With 
gov. 
struc.. 
% 
No. 
Ent. 
With 
gov. 
struc.. 
% 
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1 Market 
governance 
10
3 91 63 95 
12
7 94 352 100 
2 Internal 
governance 
10
3 2 
63 
 
12
7  
 
352 0 
3 Hybrid 
governance 
10
3 7 
63 
5 
12
7 6 
352 
 
  Table 3 . Styles of governance according to industries  
 
Referring to the above table, we can conclude that the basic governance structure is 
market structure, in 90% of surveyed companies. This fact, but not only, confirm that 
management styles for this sample of selected enterprises, represent a trend not very 
dynamic, with participating actors often characterized by opportunistic behavior, 
characterized generally by very informal management style, not as should be focused on 
training people, lack fit their business environment, which is very dynamic, etc. 
 
Evaluation of instruments that characterize governance structures  
Referred to considerations relates to instruments that characterize governance 
structures, as well as survey results, let's try to focus on a more concrete analysis in several 
agribusiness industries, by identifying some of the most important issues facing enterprises 
regarding they adopt governance structures, focusing on governance of the market and hybrid 
governance. 
 
Market governance structure  
Referring to the statement above, we can do a more completed evaluation of basic 
characteristic instruments to processing industries obtained in the analysis. 
 
 Stimulus intensity  
Although it is a characteristic of market governance structure, this phenomenon is not 
presented with the same intensity for the industries surveyed in this analysis. For the meat 
industry and the dairy is estimated stimulus intensity scale. This, for the fact that in meat 
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industry the raw material comes mainly from imports, domestic producers are not 
essential actors in the chain, the contracts system doesn’t works etc. 
 
 
 
 Independence in the relationship between actors  
Independence in the relationship between actors is a characteristic instrument of 
market governance structure. As was shown in the picture below, the meat and dairy 
industry, independence in relations between the actors is much greater, while for the wine 
industry and olive oil it can be estimated as an average. 
 
 Opportunistic behavior among actors  
Independence is the relationship between actors is the leading cause of opportunistic 
behavior between actors in a value chain. As noted above, the meat industry and dairy, 
independence in relations between the actors resulted in the highest settings, 
opportunistic behavior among the actors are considered as an average, and this mainly 
due to lack of contracts, where for the sake of truth in the meat industry it is a more 
present phenomenon. 
 
 Lack of contracts  
From the point of view of contracts use, the four surveyed industries in this analysis 
result almost with the same problem, except the meat industry, where almost are not 
present contracts with local suppliers. In the wine, olive oil and milk industry, the 
contracts system functions partially, but because of non active participation in the chain, 
often the actors are characterized by opportunistic relationship between them. 
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Govern
ance 
Structu
res 
Occurences and problems that governance structures  
 
Processing industries  
Wi
ne 
Mea
t 
Oliv
e oil 
Milk 
Mark
et 
gover
nance 
 Actors in the value chain are characterized by high 
stimulus intensity 
XX
X 
XX XX
X 
XX 
 Relationships between actors (farmers, processors) are 
independent 
XX XX
X 
XX XX
X 
 Actors involved in the value chain are characterized by 
opportunistic behavior 
XX XX X XX 
 Governance is characterized by adapter independent 
mechanisms 
XX XX XX XX 
 Lack of contracts is a present phenomenon XX XX
X 
XX XX 
 The most Incentive motive for farmers is just the price XX
X 
XX
X 
XX
X 
XX 
 The main incentive for the processor is not only the 
price and quality 
XX
X 
XX
X 
XX
X 
XX
X 
 Government faces additional costs as research costs, 
information costs of raw materials, monitoring cost 
(continuous laboratory tests for the quality of raw 
XX
X 
XX X XX 
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materials), bargaining cost (negotiation, agreement), etc. 
 Processors are threatened by uncertainty for the quality 
of raw materials 
XX
X 
XX
X 
XX
X 
XX
X 
 Processors are threatened by uncertainty for raw 
materials 
XX X XX XX 
 Little or no attempt to coordinate actions between actors 
in the chain 
X 0 XX X 
 The role of a mediator is very important to facilitate 
coordination between actors 
XX
X 
XX
X 
XX
X 
XX 
Inter
nal 
gover
nance 
 Processors tend to be integrated into raw material sources 
(back integration) 
XX 0 XX X 
 Producers of raw materials tend to develop processing 
activities 
X 0 X XX 
 Transaction costs are minimized (search costs, 
information, bargaining costs, monitoring, etc.)  
XX
X 
XX
X 
XX XX 
 Increase of decision-making power XX
X 
XX XX
X 
X 
 Increase of  the need to administrative control and 
motivation elements 
XX
X 
XX XX
X 
XX 
 Reduction of proccesors uncertainty to ensure raw XX XX XX XX
European Scientific Journal          June edition vol. 8, No.12   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)    e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
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materials X X X X 
  Favorable prices of inputs XX
X 
XX
X 
XX
X 
XX
X 
 Increase of coordination level XX
X 
XX
X 
XX
X 
XX 
 Facilitate of firm adaption to environmental concerns of 
the industry 
XX XX XX
X 
XX
X 
 
Legend:        XXX too many:            XX average:                 X few,                 0 none 
Table 4. Governace structures and implications according to indutries  
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 Price as the only incentive motive for manufactures  
Referring to the organizational form of enterprises in the surveyed industries in this 
analysis (all non-cooperative form), and market governance structure, it is clear that the 
price is perhaps the only incentive motive for producers of raw materials. But if you 
consider the fact that these industries import of raw materials occupies a considerable 
weight, can easily conclude that for our conditions, the instrument "price" of plays a little 
role. 
 
 Price and quality as an incentive motive for manufactures  
For processors of products with agricultural origin, the quality of raw materials is a 
fundamental problem. One of the basic argument that bring executives and managers of 
agro-industry enterprises related with  imports of raw materials, is exactly what relates to 
the quality, but without doubt, the prize has its role and importance. Imports of raw 
materials for agro-industry are influenced by the problems associated with the above two 
factors, as well as the problems associated with lack, fragmented supply etc. 
 
 Additional costs due to transaction costs  
Now it is clear that the government market face additional costs due to presence of 
transaction costs as the research cost, information cost, monitoring cost (continuous 
laboratory tests for the quality of raw materials), bargaining cost (negotiation, agreements, 
etc.). Analysis made by us shows that the additional costs of the transaction, as a 
characteristic instrument of market governance, show high intensity in the wine industry, 
average intensity of the meat and dairy industry and low in olive oil industry. 
 
 Threat from raw materials uncertainty  
Estimates made by us show that for the industries under consideration, the threat of 
uncertainty for raw materials is considered in average levels and with setting "weak" when 
it comes to the meat industry because the industry finds itself mainly agricultural import 
markets. 
 
 Little or no attempt to coordinate actions between actors  
A structure of market governance can hardly be efficient out concrete schemes that 
enable the coordination of actions between actors in a value chain. But, the results of our 
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analysis show that in the field are observed very few initiatives to coordinate actions 
between actors. In the wine and milk industry they could be considered at low level, 
intermediate level in the olive oil industry and in the meat industry they are almost non 
existent. 
 
 The role of intermidiaries for coordination between actors  
It is quite clear that the coordination of actions between actors in a value chain is 
considered as extremely important for wine, meat, olive oil industries and in average for 
the milk industry. He can be accomplished through different intermediaries, who may be 
producers’ cooperatives, organizations, associations, etc. We note that in this regard 
processing industries can play an important role, following step by step manufacturing 
activities of farmers, and contributing financially. 
 
Structure of hybrid governance  
 Processors tent to be integrated toward resources of raw materials  
Integration into sources of raw materials (early integration) is one of the characteristic 
instruments of internal and hybrid governance structure. Referred to analysis and 
assessment in the table made above, we can conclude that for the surveyed industries in 
this analysis, this management strategy appears to be little or no applied by companies 
representing the studied industries. For example, for meat industry, this kind of integration 
can be not even imagine, for the dairy industry he appears weak, while for other industries 
there are two companies focused on the implementation of this strategy. 
 
 Producers of raw materials tent to develop processing activities  
For the current stage of development of farm and agribusiness enterprises, can be 
considered and evaluated as a good management strategy of enterprises. Currently, this 
strategy turns out to be significantly implemented in the dairy industry and in special 
cases in the wine and olive oil industry. 
 
 Minimization of transaction costs  
For hybrid governance structure, minimization of transaction costs is one of the most 
important characteristic instruments. It is true that this governance structure face 
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additional costs, as are the costs of administration, but despite this fact, the profits due to 
the reduction of transaction costs would be substantial and this in particular for enterprises 
of wine and meat industry. 
 
 Increase of decision making power  
Represents an important characteristic instrument of a flexible internal and hybrid 
governance structure. Referring to our analysis, it is more pronounced for the wine 
industry and olive oil. From this point of view must be also needed increase of 
administrative control and other motivation elements, where it again turns to be more 
prononced in the wine and olive oil industry. 
 
 Reduction of uncertainty to provide raw amterials  
Providing in time, quality and quantity of raw materials poses a major challenge for 
any governance structure. Internal and hybrid governance structure are two alternatives 
quite useful to reduce uncertainty and increase the performance of agro-industry 
enterprises. The effect of this instrument is very sensitive to four types of surveyed 
industries in this analysis and this can be said as regards to the benefits that enterprises 
have related to the availability of favorable prices for inputs. 
 Gretater adaption possibilities to environmental concerns of the industry   
Adaptation of the company to environmental concerns is another characteristic 
instrument of internal and hybrid governance structure. Estimates made by us in the 
statement above shows that this instrument is very susceptible to the milk industry 
enterprises and olive oil and this also for the fact that hybrid governance for these two 
industries encourages and stimulates the development of enterprises with closed cycle. 
 
Conclusion: 
Naturally we cannot provide prescriptions about governance structures that can adopt 
an enterprise or another; however, based on analysis and evaluation above and within specific 
industries, we arrived at the conclusions: 
 
 For wine industry  
For the wine industry dominates the market governance. The analysis made above 
leads us to the conclusion that the market governance structure with coordinated actors 
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among themselves, as well as hybrid governance structure, would be more appropriate 
strategies. 
 For wine industry  
Referring to the problems that the meat industry face, we estimate that market 
governance could be considered as a found solution. Under this strategy, we estimate that 
the activities coordination of actors through producers and processors associations is a 
necessity. Reorientation of the farmers activity not only for milk but also for meat, will 
dictate naturally the implementation of hybrid governance structure with coordinated 
actors among them. 
 
 For olive oil  
For olive oil industry dominates the market governance. Considering what we have 
stated above, hybrid governance structure, with trend the market governance structure 
market but with coordinated actors among themselves, would be based on development 
strategies of enterprises of this industry. 
 
 For milk industry  
Even for milk industry dominates market governance. For the nature of this industry 
market governance structure but with coordinated actors between them, would be the basis 
strategy of enterprise development of this industry. 
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